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ABSTRACT This article analyses the 2003 reform of the EU Common Agricultural
Policy. On the basis of rational choice theory, it addresses to two basic questions: first,
which processes led to the 2003 CAP reform? And second, how can the actual content
of the reform — with, for example, increased bureaucratisation and more diffuse imple-
mentation — be accounted for? The article concludes that it is possible to rationally
answer the two questions and that the external pressure resulting from the impending
WTO negotiations represented a necessary, if insufficient, condition for reform. In
order to arrive at an adequate explanation, an account of the policy entrepreneurship
on the part of Commissioner Franz Fischler must also be given.
KEY WORDS: Agricultural reform, CAP, government failures, political asymmetry
Introduction
The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been criticised extensively
for many years. It has been disparaged for being too costly for consumers and
an excessively heavy burden on taxpayers. The CAP has also been criticised
for impeding imports from developing countries and simultaneously under-
mining sustainable Third World agricultural production because of export
dumping. Additionally, the CAP has been criticised for representing one of
the main obstacles to worldwide free trade and, in general, for having a very
detrimental influence on international relations. Finally, the CAP has also
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been criticised for harming the physical environment in the EU member
states.
Hence, from this perspective, CAP reform is in demand. Explaining why
most of the ‘demanded’ CAP reforms have not taken place and, therefore,
why other reforms — ultimately — have taken place has been of scholarly
interest to economists and political scientists. The object of analysis in this
article is the 2003 CAP reform. It attempts to answer two basic questions:
first, which processes led to reform? And second, how can the actual content
of the reform be accounted for? These two questions should be seen as two
sides of the same coin: the processes leading to reform are the same processes
that account for the specific content of the reform.
Neither of these questions was adequately answered in a coherent theory
in the literature that emerged in the wake of the 1992 reform (e.g., Coleman
& Tangermann 1999; Daugbjerg, 1999; Moyer & Josling 2002; Paarlberg
1997; Meunier 2000; Patterson 1997; Keeler 1996; Lynggaard 2005). Tradi-
tionally, political scientists have focused on explaining why this reform came
about, often carrying out a multilevel analysis as part of the explanatory
framework, whereas economists have focused on explaining the irrationali-
ties of the reform.1 By answering the two questions above, these two tradi-
tions are combined. At the same time, it will be argued that a coherent theory
is needed that is based on the common characteristics of the actors involved
and the political system wherein the actors do their job. A number of condi-
tions derived from the theory will also be put forward, which must be
fulfilled if the theory is to pass an ‘argumentative test’ based on a selection
of the empirical material concerning the 2003 reform.
It will be argued that both of these questions can be answered using ratio-
nal choice theory. At the same time, this also serves as a critical test of the
theory as it is normally used when explaining why policy changes do not
happen. The basic tenet of rational choice theory is that, overwhelmingly,
individuals all behave rationally most of the time and that this simple behav-
ioural assumption should be made for the behaviour of individuals in the
economic system of the market forces, as well as in the political system of the
political ‘market forces’. The simple reason for making this assumption is
that people can be expected to behave exactly the same way in both systems.
As a consequence of the aforementioned behavioural assumption,
however, the political system — in contrast to the economic system —
becomes asymmetrical when the advantages that people may obtain are
concentrated and private in character, e.g., in public pensions, kindergar-
tens, and agricultural subsidies and protectionism, whereas the financing is,
by nature, public and, therefore, spread among all taxpayers. The asymmet-
rical political system is a core concept in rational choice theory and the
independent variable in explanations based on this theory. This asymmetry
is found in both the national political systems of the EU member states and
at the EU level. It will even be argued that the political system is even more
asymmetrical at the EU level.
As a result of the asymmetries in the political system, a range of hypotheses
will be derived regarding the conditions necessary to facilitate CAP reform.
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Anticipating the conclusions from the discussion in the section on ‘CAP,
institutions and political asymmetry’, the hypotheses derived from rational
choice theory regarding the conditions for CAP reform are: 
1. External pressure is required due to the political asymmetries in the political
system;
2. The relevant commissioner must be willing to play the role of a policy
entrepreneur;
3. This policy entrepreneurship involves both the encapsulation of the deci-
sion–making process from organised interests and the strategic involve-
ment of the member states.
As pointed out by other authors (e.g., Daugbjerg 1999: 410), rational choice
theory assumes that actors are rational and self–serving, deducting prefer-
ences from this assumption in order to explain and predict. Other theories
will contextualise preference–formation in other ways, i.e., by examining the
structural embeddedness of actors or by introducing ideational or discursive
factors into the explanation. Two examples of such explanations of CAP
development will be presented. First, Daugbjerg (1999) argues that the
structure of policy networks in the CAP and the broader EU institutional
structure have led policy makers in the direction of moderate reforms.
Second, Lynggaard (2005) argues that institutional change in the CAP has
been preconditioned by the discursive existence of alternative ideals, the
dynamic inherent in translation processes, conflicts of opinion, and policy
entrepreneurship.
Generally, both of these political science perspectives explain why the
2003 reform came about, as does the theoretical framework advanced in this
article; however, they do not explain the overall content of the reform. At the
same time, it will be argued that rational choice theory not only covers both
what led to reform and the content of the reform, but also provides the best
explanations in the simplest ways (cf. the principle of Ockham’s razor).
Ideational and network explanations complicate matters unnecessarily and
there is no additional explanatory power gained from doing so.2 The reason
is that these two explanations do not have an explicit theory about the polit-
ical system they are analysing.
The Political Economy of the CAP
As argued above, in order to answer why the politicians decided to reform
the CAP, including how and when they decided to reform it in the manner
they did, there must be a theory about what determines political decisions.
Normally, politicians decide on a political issue according to their
expectations of voter reaction. Voters, on the other hand, must consider costs
in terms of time and money when forming their preferences and transmitting
them to politicians. If the voter is even minimally rational, a minimum of
benefits for him or her is necessary, if he or she should accept the cost of
collecting information and transmitting preferences to political decision–
makers (Nello 1984). However, merely attaining information about the
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impact and extent of public support for agriculture is difficult and costly, as
the support is very often either given by inflating consumer prices or by
complicated bureaucratic measures, and thus obscured in both cases.
In the theory of rational choice — where the ‘political market’ is used as a
metaphor — it is assumed that politicians ‘supply’ political decisions in order
to get re–elected. Especially in relation to agricultural policy decisions, support
from agricultural organisations is often more important than indicated by the
actual number of votes in the agricultural sector. This is due to the fact that
supporting agriculture gives politicians a base for attracting non–agricultural
votes from rural areas as well as from agricultural supply industries (such as
farm machinery, seeds and veterinary medicine). Moreover, agricultural
organisations generally have a high political profile on the grounds that an
important part of farmers’ income stems from political rent–seeking. This
means that the basic condition for the survival of farmers and farming organ-
isations is to be found in the creation of public awareness. Politicians with
positive attitudes towards agricultural interests will benefit from this
(Nedergaard 2006a; Keeler 1996; Nello 1984; Ballisacan & Roumasset 1987).
Alongside politicians, bureaucrats are important purveyors of agricultural
decisions. In rational choice theory it is assumed — even though politicians
formally make the political decisions under the counsel of the administration
— that bureaucrats are also independent actors who maximise their own
utility by preserving or expanding their power base, budgets and career
opportunities. In the agricultural area, bureaucrats probably have consider-
able influence because the area is characterised by an array of technicalities
and specific rules.
Bureaucrats must be expected to be even more in favour of continuing and
further developing agricultural protectionism than agro–politicians on the
grounds that they would gain fewer benefits from granting consideration to
general national or European economic and political interests. Bureaucrats
can normally only be expected to abandon the agricultural protectionist line
if the present agricultural policy directly weakens their relationships with
other parts of the administration. For example, the Commission’s Director-
ate–General for Agriculture has been pressing for moderate CAP reform for
years because the former line was creating an increasing number of conflicts
with its surroundings within the Commission and with external actors
outside of the Commission. The agricultural policy has been particularly
damaging for the international relations of the Commission, its reputation in
general, and especially its ability to act in an efficient manner under the inter-
national trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where the Commission
acts as an agent on behalf of the EU member states (Meunier 2000; Keeler
1996). Additionally, bureaucrats in the agricultural ministries of the member
states are only supposed to be in favour of CAP reform when they are put
under pressure from bureaucrats in other ministries.
One of the original CAP objectives was to improve farmer incomes which
generally were — and remain — below average relative to many other
economic sectors. EU farmers have traditionally been supported through
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price support measures, even though all theory and experience indicate that
such support is not an optimal instrument for meeting income objectives.
This is especially true of small production farmers.
The political asymmetry of the CAP also has a general welfare economic
impact on the member state economies and the total EU economy. There is
broad consensus in economic literature regarding the theoretical framework
for analysing the economic impact of agricultural policies. This framework
consists of a calculation of the welfare losses, the so–called ‘deadweight
losses’. The economic losses are divided between losses for consumers and
taxpayers and economic gains for producers. The ‘deadweight losses’ are the
extent to which the economic losses suffered by consumers and taxpayers
exceed the economic gains achieved by producers.
On the basis of different estimates of the extent of the welfare losses
shown, it can be concluded that the economic welfare losses of the CAP are
considerable (OECD 2003). Until the beginning of the 1990s, taxpayers had
suffered relatively smaller losses (compared to the consumers), only footing
about a quarter of the bill (OECD 2004b, 49). Since the 1992 reform,
however, taxpayers have gradually contributed relatively more to the CAP,
while consumers have paid relatively less. In 2003, every EU inhabitant bore
an annual burden of approximately 320 euros, with 51 per cent as a taxpayer
and 49 per cent as a consumer (Wichern 2004, 23 & 55). In aggregate terms,
approximately 56 billion euros have been transferred from consumers to
producers each year in the period from 2001 to 2003, and approximately 60
billion euros have been transferred from taxpayers to producers (OECD
2004b, 49).
As a result of the 2003 CAP reform, there will be an even greater decrease
in taxpayers’ welfare (OECD 2004a, 43). In welfare economic terms,
however, the 2003 reform will probably slightly improve the general welfare
economy of the EU. This is due to the fact that direct payments and price
support have different welfare effects. Price support increases the prices paid
by consumers and producers when buying fodder for livestock. Direct
payments affect producers and taxpayers, but not consumers. This is also
why, for years, economists — the lesser of two evils — have recommended
direct payments instead of price support. For the very reason that this recom-
mendation has been on the table for so many years, it cannot explain why
the 2003 CAP reform was adopted. The fact that political decision–makers
ignore the overall economic impact of their political decisions is generally
also what one should expect according to rational choice theory, because it
will not have any impact on the re–election prospects for politicians or the
situation of bureaucrats.3
For many years, the common financing of the CAP meant that each
member state increased the repayments from the budget by encouraging their
respective farmers to expand their agricultural production. At the same time,
an important internal factor is supposed to press for limiting excessive costs
of CAP for member states that are net contributors to the EU budget, e.g.,
the United Kingdom and Germany. However, the solution has been a budget-
ary rebate for the UK that can be interpreted as a political means to reduce
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their criticism or potential criticism of the CAP budgetary costs. Germany
also received a moderate budgetary rebate in the wake of the UK rebate.
This is also why the CAP has been compared with the well–known rational
choice example in which a group of people visits a restaurant and agrees to
share the bill without taking into account what and how much each partici-
pant will be eating (Nello 1984). This has been so much more the case as far
as the CAP is concerned, because the Council of Ministers for Agriculture
could make decisions while allowing the Finance Ministers to foot the bill.
For many years, even the German agricultural minister was happy, in spite
of the fact that his finance ministers had to pay three times the money he
himself had ‘collected’ for German farmers in the Council of Ministers for
Agriculture. However, it is interesting to note that this did not cause serious
attempts to reform the CAP (Keeler 1996). The internal ‘money machine’
that the CAP had turned itself into did not produce the pressure necessary to
motivate the EU decision–makers to reform the CAP and stop the accelerat-
ing costs of the policy.
As predicted in rational choice theory, the strength of political asymme-
tries in the decision–making process is more important than net budgetary
effects in order to predict a member state’s position vis–à–vis a CAP reform.
This is evidenced by the fact that if there is a conflict between the net
budgetary effect and strong interest organisations, the latter appears to gain
the upper hand under normal circumstances. As indicated in the paragraph
above, Germany is the clearest example of such a conflict.
As a significant exporter of industrial produce, Germany has a vital
interest in liberal world trade and, by implication, in the success of the GATT
and WTO trade rounds. For many years, however, this was not enough to
put pressure on the German agricultural minister.
All in all, as predicted, the influence of farmers and the tribute paid by
political decision–makers to farmers and the rural areas play a more impor-
tant role for the individual member state’s attitude towards a restructuring
of the CAP than the member state’s net economic benefits or losses resulting
from the CAP in general. For example, one ought to expect that the modest
position of German agriculture in the German economy and the relatively
small contributions from the CAP would result in a positive German attitude
towards thorough and purely market–oriented CAP reform. Naturally,
specific historical circumstances probably did play a role; nevertheless,
Germany’s strange position in the Council of Ministers for Agriculture has
largely worked against Germany’s economic interests as a whole. However,
such a purely economic prediction does not correspond to reality. In other
words, the asymmetries outlined above are much more decisive in predicting
policy positions than diffuse economic benefits for member states or the EU
as a whole.
CAP, Institutions and Political Asymmetry
It was argued above that, in the area of agricultural policy, the general
asymmetry which — according to rational choice theory — is constantly
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present in collective political decisions becomes heightened by the ‘suppliers’
who have independent reasons for reinforcing a complicated, protectionist
‘super asymmetric’ agricultural policy. However, a stronger reflection of
individual preferences could be achieved by limiting the general asymmetry
of political decisions and by limiting the strong asymmetry that is specific to
agriculture. Rational choice theory generally recommends the establishment
of institutions in order to place restraints on the utility–maximising actors,
whether interest groups or member states. These institutions should be
designed in order to bring about a larger degree of correlation between the
particular and common interests. In the CAP, one way of doing so could be
to strengthen the horizontal political element in the much ‘segmented’, tech-
nical and highly complex agricultural decision–making process. This can be
brought about by allowing other politicians — rather than agro–politicians
alone — to participate in the agricultural decision–making process.
It is plausible that this is what is happening; particularly as regards the
European Council meetings, which have occasionally played the role of a
moderate counterweight to the agricultural policy–making process in recent
years, not least in cases of major reform initiatives with regard to the agricul-
tural policy and the EU budget.
The European Council works across the sectional division lines of the EU.
Consequently, it also appears to take better care of the overall EU interests
than the Council of Ministers. This is also why the European Council has
occasionally contributed to the weakening of the political asymmetry in the
EU decision–making process. Decisions were made at the European Council
meetings in Brussels (February 1988), Edinburgh (December 1992) and
Berlin (March 1999) to tighten the budgetary procedures and keep agricul-
tural expenditures within certain limits. Most notably, the European Council
acted as the principal moderator at the Berlin summit in March 1999 by
slightly reducing spending in relation to the original proposal from the
Commission (EU Bulletin 3, 1999). The adjustments were not radical, as the
European Council agreement only reduced spending by approximately 2.4
billion euros. However, this adjustment is notable, as the European Council
did act as the primary moderator in this instance.
On the other hand, the European Council has only occasionally played the
role in an effective manner in order to reduce the political asymmetry in the
CAP political system. Due to the fact that France is a main CAP beneficiary
— and due to the Franco–German axis, wherein France played the dominant
part — the European Council has not consistently been efficient in reducing
the political asymmetry as far as CAP is concerned.
The European Parliament represents another horizontal political element
in the European decision–making process. Again, however, this institution
would not appear to have generated a reduction in the political asymmetry
due to the European Parliament with regard to the CAP. There are two main
reasons for this: firstly, the direct influence of the European Parliament on
the CAP is rather modest, as the Parliament is only consulted on CAP issues
and, therefore, is merely able to provide political backing to the various CAP
reform proposals.4 Secondly, the European Parliament is a long way from
210 Peter Nedergaard
playing the role of an active counterweight to the specific sector interests at
the European level. Until now, the Parliament has normally adopted a very
positive stance concerning all kinds of European legislation and expenditures
in order to increase its European power base.5
At the same time, Members of the European Parliament have no power to
tax citizens and companies and are therefore never held accountable for
increasing budgetary expenditures.
In the final analysis, it is the ministers of agriculture in the Council of
Ministers that make the decisions concerning the CAP. The decision–making
structure of this body is therefore important as an institutional constraint on
member state behaviour. According to the Treaty, it is possible to make a
decision about the CAP with a qualified majority (about two–thirds of the
votes weighted by country size) in the Council of Ministers.6
Rational choice theorists have often argued in favour of veto voting (or at
least voting with a qualified majority), claiming that this would be Pareto
optimal.7 However, it is a precondition that there is a well–functioning
market for logrolling, whereby a legislator promises to vote for a project
favoured by another legislator, expecting some equivalent act of support in
return at a later date (e.g., Buchanan & Tullock 1962). This is not always the
case in the EU, where the decision–making competence has been split
between the individual Councils of Ministers. On the other hand, logrolling
opportunities have increased in the EU as other areas of cooperation have
gained weight.
An institutional explanation contributing to the 2003 agricultural reform
is, undoubtedly, that increased integration and amended voting regulations
have increased logrolling opportunities and package deals. Here, the
European Council often functions as a market for logrolling, where specific
interests are traded. Interests in upholding the status quo have hereby been
weakened. Nevertheless, there is a lack of a strong opponent against the agri-
cultural ministers in the agricultural decision–making process, an opponent
that could otherwise pursue the financial interests of the EU, the consumers
and the environment, even though a financial discipline mechanism now
allows for payment levels to be reduced automatically if CAP expenditures
exceed its budget ceilings (OECD 2004b). At the national level, these
opponents are established in the form of the Finance Ministry, the Ministry
of the Environment, and so on, in the government and national parliaments.
Last, but not least, the European Commission appears to play a role in
order to place restraints on the utility–maximising actors in the EU. There is
little doubt at the level of the Commission that it (together with the EU
Court) is the institution most inclined to moderate the political asymmetry
of the EU political system, especially because commissioners are appointed
to serve the general European interests without having to care about voter
reactions.8 According to the Treaty, the Commission is responsible for pursu-
ing the common interests of the EU. However, the fact that the commission-
ers are not elected is, at the same time, a fundamental weakness of the
Commission; it lacks democratic legitimacy compared to the Council of
Ministers. The authority of the Commission to serve the interests of the EU
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as a whole therefore greatly depends on the general integration cycle, i.e.,
whether or not EU integration is looked upon positively by key decision–
makers. When the European integration cycle is positive, the legitimacy of
the Commission increases and, hence, the Commission is normally also able
to serve the general interests of the EU more efficiently.
No matter what, the Commission plays a powerful role in the EU decision–
making system because of its right and obligation to make proposals to the
Council of Ministers. At the same time, if the Council of Ministers wants to
amend a proposal from the Commission, these changes must be accepted by
the Commission. Hence, the Commission — and the commissioner responsi-
ble for a specific area like the CAP — has some room for manoeuvre when
playing the role of agent on behalf of its principals, i.e., the member states
(Pollack 2003).
The Commission has also often put forward reform proposals concerning
the CAP that have later been diluted by the Council of Ministers. The EU
budgetary expenditures would thus have been lower if the Commission’s
proposals had been adopted unchanged. On the other hand, the European
Parliament has normally asked for increasing expenditures in the same policy
areas, except in a few instances in the 1980s (cf. endnote 5).
It is normally clear that, in the EU, the institutional political counter-
weights relative to agricultural interests are too weak to play a decisive role
in the pressure for a fundamental regime change in the CAP. Reforms are
rare, come late, and are often profoundly watered down. Hence, the EU
political system could be characterised as a super asymmetrical political
system. The political institutions — which can potentially knock some of the
political asymmetries at the national level off balance — are generally too
weak to initiate reforms at the European level. However, the Commission
has certain characteristics enabling it to function in the interest of the EU as
a whole as far as the CAP is concerned, even though its ability to function is
often undermined by the Council of Ministers and/or the European Council.
The capacity of the European Council to make decisions on CAP reform has
often been damaged by the Franco–German axis (which, in practice, meant
that Germany capitulated to French demands as far as the CAP is concerned
for many years). At the same time, the European Parliament has limited
influence on the CAP and can only be expected to contribute with more
diffuse backing of reform proposals, especially when they do not reduce the
overall level of support for farmers. Due to the fact that the EU is a ‘super
asymmetrical political system’, external pressure of some kind is expected to
be a precondition for CAP reform.
In short, based on the analysis above, three ex ante conditions that can
punctuate the former equilibrium on the ‘political market’ and lead to a
successful adoption of CAP reform can be derived from rational choice
theory: first, due to the super asymmetrical political system of the EU, CAP
reform requires external pressure. Second, the relevant commissioner must
be willing to use his manoeuvring room in order to play the role of policy
entrepreneur. Third, policy entrepreneurship involves both an encapsulation
of part of the EU decision–making process from interference from the
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characteristics of the CAP asymmetrical political system, i.e., from interest
organisations and/or national politicians/bureaucrats and a willingness to
strategically involve member states and interest organisations during the
reform process, even though it may possibly cost future allies.
The next section provides an empirical ‘argumentative test’ of the theory
in this article.
CAP Reform of 2003
For several years prior to the 2003 reform, the Commission had been press-
ing for further CAP reform. As early as July 1997, the Commission proposed
a reform of the CAP within the framework of Agenda 2000 (which was a
kind of blueprint for future EU policy development), as it was faced by the
expected EU enlargement. Negotiations on Agenda 2000 — and some
elements of new CAP reform — were concluded at the Berlin European
Council in March 1999. However, the Berlin summit only set the framework
for future CAP reform initiatives, because, for the most part, it had to be
filled out in following years by concrete reform proposals to be adopted by
agricultural ministers taking into account the WTO negotiations, which
began in March 2000, and by a number of regulations that the Commission
could adopt alone.
In order to provide an overview, Table 1 contains a list of CAP reforms
since 1984. It draws on Sabatier and Jenkins–Smith’s (1999) categorisation
of policy reforms and on Daugbjerg (1999) as far as the main content of CAP
reforms until 1999 is concerned.
The proposal for a CAP reform in Agenda 2000 was primarily a reform of
technical aspects of the CAP contrary to the MacSharry Reform seven years
earlier, which also changed the CAP policy instruments.
Besides adopting a CAP reform containing a number of technical changes,
in the conclusions from the European Council meetings on 24 and 25 March
1999, in Berlin, the heads of state encouraged the Commission to put
forward a report to the Council of Ministers in 2002 on the development of
the CAP.9 According to several sources, already in 2001, persons surround-
ing agricultural commissioner Franz Fischler began to plan more than just
the ordinary Mid term Review of the CAP that the European Council had
requested. Both external and internal circumstances explain why Fischler
and others felt the need and opportunity to consider a new CAP reform only
one year after the Agenda 2000 reform had laid down the foundation for
adoption of the CAP until 2006.
In November 2000, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE, also
known as ‘mad cow disease’) had spread within the EU, from the UK to the
European continent, and no longer represented an isolated British problem.
In a speech in 2001, Fischler argued that “food safety crises … tend to
generate in many citizens the conviction, that a disconnect exists between
what EU agriculture supplies and what the citizens demand” (Fischler
2001). In the same speech, Fischler also mentioned the need for the CAP to
become more economically, environmentally and socially sustainable. This
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led Fischler to enquire whether the CAP instruments were optimal for
attaining the CAP objectives, whether the CAP had unintended distributive
consequences, and what the budgetary consequences of the CAP were in the
long run.
Fischler also had external pressure in mind. As mentioned above, the WTO
negotiations were about to resume after the Seattle failure in 1999. Later, in
Doha in 2001, it was decided that the negotiations ought to lead to further
cuts in agricultural support as far as it had disruptive consequences for
production and trade. Fischler therefore also asked whether the CAP was in
line with the rules of the upcoming WTO agreement, i.e., how the CAP
affected trade and how trade affected the political instruments of the CAP.
As far as the external and internal factors, respectively, are concerned, the
international trade negotiations are the varying factor placing pressure on
CAP reform, whereas the internal factors have been around for several years
and are relatively stable. This was also seen in the 1992 CAP reform, where
Table 1. Overview of CAP reforms since 1984
Year/name
Type of 
reform* Main content of reform
1984 Milk 
quota reform
Technical 
changes
Reform of expenses. Introduction of quotas on milk production 
and control with production of cereals and wine.
The idea of subsidising farmers and protecting them from market 
forces remained intact.
1988 Stabiliser 
reform
Technical 
changes
Follow–up on 1984 reform. Introduction of budget stabilisers 
and stricter budgetary discipline. Doubling of the structural 
policy funding.
The idea of subsidising farmers and protecting them from market 
forces remained intact.
1992 
MacSharry 
reform
Moderate 
policy 
changes
Reform of policy instruments. Primary policy instruments 
altered from price support to acreage payments.
The idea of subsidising farmers and protecting them from market 
forces remained intact.
1999 Agenda 
2000 reform
Technical 
changes
Further deepening of the 1992 reform with a reduction in price 
support and a range of measures to prepare CAP for the 
enlargement.
The idea of subsidising farmers and protecting them from market 
forces remained intact.
2003 Mid term 
review/ 
Fischler reform
Moderate 
policy 
changes
Direct payments decoupled from production replace, to a certain 
extent, price support. Farmers must comply with certain 
standards for animal welfare, food quality and the environment.
The idea of subsidising farmers and protecting them from market 
forces remained intact.
*Sabatier & Jenkins–Smith (1999) distinguished between three levels of policy changes: 1) changes in the 
deep policy core, when a policy is revolutionized, 2) policy changes, when a policy is moderately 
changed, and 3) technical changes of a policy.
Sources: Sabatier and Jenkins–Smith (1999), Daugbjerg (1999) and the author.
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external pressure also played an important role (Nedergaard 1995, 141;
Daugbjerg 1999, 208).
Fischler’s speech can be interpreted as an attempt to gather a coalition of
support for new CAP reform. Faced with a rational choice type of a super
asymmetrical political system as far as the CAP is concerned, Fischler and the
Commission needed a broad coalition behind the demand for new CAP
reform. In building this coalition, he attempted to include a normally diverse
group of actors in favour of better food safety, cuts in the agricultural
budgets, less intensive farming, more free trade, and the improved access of
developing countries to European markets. The member states, organisations
and individuals supporting one or more of these goals shared in common the
fact that they supported CAP reform. When the negotiations for the new plan
for CAP reform began, it became apparent that the coalition for CAP reform
could either not agree on the kind of reform they wanted or could not see all
their dreams fulfilled in the final compromise. On the other hand, at that
time, the initial coalition behind the demand for reform had served its
purpose to legitimise the need to put forward a plan for CAP reform.
Ideas regarding a more thorough CAP reform spread during 2001 and in
the beginning of 2002. On 17 April 2002, all the commissioners held an
extraordinary meeting about a possible new CAP reform (Agra Facts No.
34, 2002). In his intervention, Franz Fischler explicitly dealt with the EU’s
external relations and the CAP, as the question of the developing countries
had now become an important part of the legitimisation of CAP reform
prior to 2006 (Agra Facts No. 34, 2002). Fischler explained that he was
driving in the middle of the road between, on the one hand, for example,
COPA (“no changes are needed before 2006”),10 and, on the other hand,
NGOs such as Oxfam, the highly active British organisation (“get rid of
CAP now”).11
Franz Fischler chose to present his plan for a new CAP reform to the
European Parliament on 10 July 2002. This was probably a deliberate
choice, as he expected the Parliament to become a future potential ally for
his reform plans. In spite of the fact that the European Parliament has limited
direct influence on CAP reforms, this institution is, after all, a horizontal
institution which should, in principle, be aiming at that which is in the
general interest of the EU. Fischler’s speech was entitled ‘Towards Sustain-
able Farming’ (Fischler 2002), and the press release from the Commission the
same day carried the subtitle ‘Winning back the trust of consumers’. Accord-
ing to Commission officials and the agricultural interest organisations, Franz
Fischler successfully kept the process very closed in the Commission in the
weeks preceding the publication of his plan for CAP reform. Few officials
were involved in preparing the new plans for CAP reform. The closed process
was a deliberate attempt at avoiding bureaucratic politics in the form of
interference from member states, organisations and even parts of Fischler’s
own general directorate prior to the publication of his plan. Based on the
assumptions about the behaviour of interest organisations and bureaucrats
in rational choice theory, interference from these two parties in the early
phase of the reform process is to be expected.
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Both the attempt to rally a broad coalition behind his reform plan and the
closed process prior to publication can easily be interpreted as the sole means
forward for Fischler and the Commission if they wanted to overcome the
strong resistance towards CAP reform, which is expected to be an integral
part of the asymmetrical EU political system in general and the CAP in
particular.
Fischler’s plan included the following elements: 
1) Full decoupling of the direct support to the farmers, i.e., that there would
no longer be any obligation to produce anything in order to get the direct
paid premiums. This element was a rather radical break with the existing
CAP structure;
2) 20 per cent of the support directed to the individual farmer should go to
support for rural areas in general;
3) Price cuts for milk and grain;
4) Introduction of the principle of cross–compliance, i.e., that the support
should be conditioned on an obligation to fulfil demands for better
environmental protection, better animal welfare, certain food safety
standards, etc.
As can be seen, his plan contained elements designed to satisfy most of the
actors in the initial coalition behind CAP reform.
In his presentation to the European Parliament, Franz Fischler started
arguing in favour of CAP reform with reference to the internal need for EU
reform (Fischler 2002). Towards the end of his speech, however, he also
referred to the fact that reform would also have two positive side effects:
rendering enlargement easier, and strengthening the EU negotiation position
in the upcoming Doha Round. Of course, this presentation was not a priority
list indicating which factors were the most decisive in order to legitimise CAP
reform. Obviously, the aim of the presentation was first and foremost to get
the European Parliament as a whole on his side in the struggle for CAP
reform, and here the internal arguments concerning sustainable farming,
food safety and other consumer policy issues appeared to represent the most
efficient framing of his argument.
From the very outset, Fischler had support for CAP reform from the
NGOs12 as well as the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Sweden; however, most member states opposed his reform plan. Seven agri-
cultural ministers from Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium
(Wallonia), Austria and Ireland even went so far as to publish a common
letter to the editor in several significant European newspapers to express
their view that CAP reform before 2006 was unnecessary, as the heads of
state had agreed upon in the Berlin Summit in 1999 upon adopting Agenda
2000. Nevertheless, in May 2003, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Greece and
Italy changed their minds, leaving France, Spain and Portugal without a
blocking minority in the Council of Ministers.13 In this perspective, Fischler’s
strategy for the adoption of CAP reform succeeded.
Among the organisations, Oxfam and other NGOs such as BEUC, the
European Consumers’ Organisation, strongly supported CAP reform before
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2006 (BEUC, Press release of 11 July 2002). COPA (the Committee of
Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union), on the
other hand, was very critical of the Fischler plan, arguing that “the Berlin
summit decision must be respected” (COPA, Press release of 10 July 2002).
The UK was the member state with the most ambitious approach to CAP
reform. The UK Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
Margaret Beckett, argued that “the EU needs to seize the initiative” [in inter-
national trade negotiations]. (Agra Europe, 8 November 2002). This was
because the EU “needs to avoid the mistakes of the Uruguay Round where
the EU was on the defensive and lost out in the negotiations as a result”
(ibid.). At the same time, according to Agra Europe (which is an authoritative
newsletter on CAP) the USA and the Cairns Group (a group of agricultural
exporting countries) were pressing from the outside for reform (Agra
Europe, 1 November 2002). Nevertheless, Franz Fischler deliberately down-
played this external pressure in order to gain support for his CAP reform
initiative.
During 2002, however, there was mounting pressure from the WTO nego-
tiations for CAP reform (Agra Europe, 29 November 2002). It was becoming
increasingly clear that the reluctance to reform CAP was going to become a
major obstacle in the Doha Round of agricultural trade liberalisation
negotiations within the WTO (ibid.). Increasingly, according to an ‘overview
paper’ by the WTO, the key issues in the WTO Doha Round had been
encapsulated in the EU’s necessary accommodations of the demands of the
US and the Cairns Group (Agra Europe, 20 December 2002). The external
pressure for reform also appears to be a necessary — though insufficient —
condition for reform of the CAP. Without external pressure on the CAP, the
super asymmetrical political system of the CAP would probably have resisted
a reform proposal and the Commission would not even have dared to present
a plan for CAP reform.
Internally, a factor that eased the resistance towards CAP reform among
member states was the Schröder–Chirac deal worked out in October 2002.
Officially, it placed limits on the future growth of the CAP budget (Agra
Europe, 10 January 2003); however, it stated that the CAP budget could
increase by 1 per cent in nominal terms per year from 2007 to 2013. This
was the price that Jacques Chirac asked for if he had to accept the enlarge-
ment. Politically, this was interpreted by France as a promise that the CAP
budget would in fact increase by 1 per cent per year. Again, Chirac used the
Franco–German axis to garner German support to avoid cuts to the total
CAP budget. Without this deal, the CAP budget would automatically —
according to the Commission’s proposal — have been cut on an annual
basis.14
Only when the asymmetrical nature of the EU political system is taken into
account does it become possible to rationally explain the Franco–German
deal. Considered in this perspective, Jacques Chirac recognised that there
was a realistic plan for CAP reform on the table that had the support of a
broad coalition; however, not yet from a majority of member states in the
Council of Ministers. He also recognised that there was pressure from
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outside the EU on the CAP because of the impending WTO negotiations. In
order to seize the initiative, he made the deal with Schröder which, in budget-
ary terms, rendered France more immune from any CAP reform, and
Schröder accepted the deal because of the asymmetry in the German ‘political
market’ concerning agricultural decisions.15
Clearly, the acute awareness of WTO realities also underlined the
Commission’s persistence with the idea of decoupling aid from production
(Agra Europe, 10 January 2003). Fischler wanted a CAP that would “no
longer be trade distorting and no longer be susceptible to attack in the
WTO” (Agra Europe, 17 January 2003).
In the autumn of 2002, the Fischler plan was on the Council of Ministers’
agenda on several occasions; however, in December 2002, it still appeared as
though there was not a majority of member states in support of the Fischler
plan.16 On the other hand, the lack of support for the Fischler plan was never
tested, as it was not a proposal that could be put on the agenda for a voting
procedure. In spite of the resistance, Fischler decided to put forward the
precise legislative proposals for a CAP reform on 22 January 2003. The
content was in line with the policy plan of 10 July 2002, though with minor
adjustments. The Commission still wanted a full decoupling, lower prices
and cross–compliance. The advantages would be that the CAP support
system would become simpler, and, at the same time, it would render the
majority of CAP support untouchable during the WTO negotiations, as it
would be part of the so–called Green Box. This is important, as it would
significantly reduce the pressure on the EU concerning agricultural support.17
Of course, COPA was as much against the concrete legislative reform
proposal as was the majority of member states in the Council of Ministers.
Only Denmark, Sweden and the UK were fully satisfied with the proposals,
even though they would have liked them to go even further in certain areas
(Agra Facts No. 7, 2003).
In defending the decoupling, Franz Fischler used the external pressure to
pursue a dual strategy in which he claimed that decoupled payments would
increase farmers’ incomes while being an “adjustment that allows us to
defend the long–term interests of CAP, with the necessary safeguards of
targeted product support where really needed”, designating France as defen-
sive (Agra Europe, 28 March 2003).
In the Council of Ministers meeting on 8 April 2003, the ministers
discussed the question of decoupling for the first time. At the meeting, only
the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark supported Fischler’s
proposal of a 100 per cent decoupling of the direct support to farmers. Most
other member states spoke in favour of a partial decoupling; however, no
member state presented a concrete proposal on what a partial decoupling
could look like.
Alongside the negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the European
Parliament prepared its own position concerning the European Commission
proposal. The idea of a partial decoupling of the financial support was first
put forward in a detailed manner in the report from the European Parlia-
ment’s Agricultural Committee (Agra Facts No. 41, 2003). The European
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Parliament thus played the role that Fischler had pledged when he presented
his plan for a new CAP reform in the European Parliament in July 2002,
namely as a constructive ally in defending the idea of CAP reform in the
general interest of the EU. And even though its support was only at the
general level, it was, at the same time, based upon detailed knowledge of
the decoupling issue.
After a long night of negotiations, a compromise was finally reached on a
new CAP reform on 26 June 2003. The compromise modified the original
proposal from the Commission, as it contained a greater number of choices
as far as decoupling was concerned (among other elements of partial
decoupling). At the same time, the prices on grain were not cut.
As expected, COPA was critical vis–à–vis the compromise. The headline
of the press release issued by COPA on 26 June 2003 was: “Decisions
undermine the Common Agricultural Policy and create uncertainty”.
However, the ministers were generally satisfied, the French, German and
Spanish ministers explicitly expressing their satisfaction with the reform
(Agra Facts No. 57, 2003). Franz Fischler referred to CAP reform as a
beginning of a new era for CAP. He also explained that “Recent days and
weeks have also shown how important it is to have an independent, European
minded Commission which is not afraid of taking courageous and sometimes
unpopular proposals in the interest of European progress” (Fischler 2003a).
Clearly, Fischler saw the Commission’s task as one of modifying the ‘super
asymmetries’ of the CAP political system.
On the other hand, NGOs such as Oxfam, BEUC and the World Wildlife
Fund — who all had supported the original Fischler plan — were not
satisfied with the watered–down compromise. They were critical because the
reform did not lay the foundation for more imports nor did it solve the prob-
lem of EU dairy dumping on poor countries (Oxfam Press Release, 27 June
2003, London). Fischler, on the other hand, had from the outset regarded the
support from Oxfam and other NGOs as something that could help start the
reform process, but not as the kind of support that could help him to reach
a final compromise as in his middle–of–the–road position in his speech of
17 April 2002 (see above).
The so–called Fischler reform package was implemented from January
2005. The reform allows for variation between and within the member states
as far as the model of implementation is concerned. The Fischler reform
introduces the partial decoupling of direct support, and member states can
choose that certain sectors in certain regions remain coupled to a smaller or
larger extent. After the implementation of the reform, the majority of
subsidies will be paid independently of production volume, through a
hectare–based ‘single farm payment’ that is linked to environmental, food
safety and animal welfare standards, rather than just production (the
principle of cross–compliance).
However, the 2003 reform was not planned to reduce the support given to
the EU farming sector (cf. the Schröder–Chirac deal of October 2002). In
budgetary terms, the support for farmers resulting from this reform relative
to the value of their output will probably increase. The dead–weight losses
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will probably only decrease slightly, so that the positive welfare effect of the
reform will be almost non–existent, even if the “maximum decoupling”
scenario comes true (OECD 2003, 25). However, the 2003 reform merely
follows the new path that the CAP took with the 1992 reform, with even
greater variety of implementation methods, more diffuse goals and greater
variety of decoupled vis–à–vis coupled sectors between and within the
individual member states.
Both member state governments and the Commission sold the CAP 2003
reform as a reform with less bureaucracy (e.g., a statement by Margaret
Beckett (2003) on 24 June 2003, and a speech by Commissioner Fischler
(2003b) on 16 October 2003), even though they did not define what was
meant by ‘less bureaucracy’. If ‘less bureaucracy’ means less paperwork for
farmers, at least one new survey cast doubts about whether this is a result of
the reform.18 If ‘less bureaucracy’ means a reduction in the number of offi-
cials used to administrate the CAP in national governments, the fact is that
more administrative staff are now occupied with CAP matters than before.
This has partly to do with the implementation of the reform, but it is also
expected that subsequent to the implementation there will generally be a
greater number of bureaucrats occupied with CAP cases than prior to the
reform; also when former measures such as the handling of stocks are elimi-
nated from consideration. This is first and foremost because of the introduc-
tion of the principle of cross–compliance as a new element in CAP, which
very often complicates the handling of payments from the CAP system.19
On the other hand, rational choice theory precisely predicts that a reform
which potentially threatens specific organised interests, member state privi-
leges, and the power of bureaucracy will have to face bureaucratisation; deals
that undermine budgetary savings and methods to circumvent changes in the
support system. Extraordinary pressure is also required just to get those
reform proposals adopted.
Normally, only strong pressures from outside of the EU can create the
necessary pressure to put a realistic reform proposal on the agenda in a super
asymmetrical political system such as the EU CAP system. It would appear
as though a necessary condition for reform, at least in super asymmetrical
political systems, is for reform pressures to come from outside of the system
itself. In short, the 2003 CAP reform was not — as otherwise claimed in the
press — a reform against all odds. On the contrary, the odds for CAP reform
in 2003 were basically quite good due to the presence of external pressure for
reform.
At the same time, other conditions, such as a commissioner and a Commis-
sion willing to reform and create a coalition behind a reform agenda, are also
necessary conditions, as is the ability to manoeuvre in the dire straits of the
Council of Ministers decision–making system, which the general public
accepts on the grounds that it is rational for them to keep themselves
uninformed about how it works.
At the end of the day, there is also a price to be paid for pressing a reform
through a super asymmetrical system in order to accommodate external
demands for reform: bureaucratic measures and other sub–optimal solutions.
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Conclusion
This article attempts to answer two basic questions concerning the 2003 CAP
reform: firstly, which processes lead to reform? Secondly, how do we explain
the actual content of the reform? Answers are produced on the basis of a
coherent rational choice theoretical concept of political asymmetry. It is
argued that the general asymmetry between farmers and consumers is sharp-
ened in the CAP because it is possible to push the costs of the expansion of
agricultural production to other member states and countries outside the EU.
This is why the EU political system can be characterised as a ‘super asymmet-
rical’ political system as regards agricultural policy decisions.
Hence, external pressure has been the decisive factor in the reform of the
CAP. This pressure had been first and foremost exercised during the WTO
negotiations. As the external pressure on the CAP intensified, the internal
asymmetry assumed new forms that were more acceptable to the external
actors. This is observed in the 2003 CAP reform, in which price support will
be gradually replaced by other support measures not offering any incentives
to increase production.
Simultaneously, the internal asymmetries in the EU decision–making
process remain. CAP reform does not therefore mean that its budgetary costs
will decrease; the 2003 CAP reform is not a reform in that meaning of the
word. As a matter of fact, as predicted by the theory, these economic facts
have not played any important role in the CAP reform process. However,
instead of primarily being funded by consumers, taxpayers will have to pay
a larger share of the social welfare costs as a result of the CAP. The
agricultural support in budgetary terms is planned to increase compared to
the situation today with 1 per cent (however, only in nominal terms) per year
until 2013. On the other hand, the new forms of direct taxpayer–based
support for the farmers are more bureaucratic and often ‘justified’ because
of compliance with a high level of ‘food safety’ and ‘environmental stan-
dards’. To the public, the new forms of support appear to be more or less
‘objective’. The taxpayers therefore continue to face high costs when trying
to obtain information about the effects of the CAP and when communicating
their preferences to the political decision–makers in order to resist farmers’
demands for increased public support. Thus, the prediction is that they will
accept these costs.
Due to these political asymmetries, international pressure for the liberali-
sation of agricultural trade has triggered internal bureaucratisation in the
CAP, which external actors find acceptable because it is less distorting to
international trade. It is precisely in this meaning of the word that the 2003
reform was in fact a reform. However, the fact that the CAP reforms lead to
increased bureaucratisation is understandable according to the theory
proposed in this article. At the same time, the fact remains that the consider-
able bureaucratic costs resulting from the CAP reform will probably even
increase, but this issue has not been of any major importance when adopting
CAP reforms, except for the fact that it was actually sold as meaning ‘less
bureaucracy’.
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According to the theory, horizontal institutions can be used in order to
solve the co–ordination difficulties stemming from asymmetries in the polit-
ical system. The European Parliament is one such horizontal institution.
However, it is doubtful whether this institution can play the role of counter-
weight to the forceful particular interests, because it has little to say as far as
CAP reforms are concerned, and still, the Parliament is a free–rider as far as
the adoption of costly legislation is concerned, which is also due to the
Franco–German axis usually undermining attempts to profoundly reform
CAP in the budgetary meaning of the word.
The European Council is another horizontal institution that has contrib-
uted in some ways to the relative weakening of the political asymmetries in
the European decision–making process through the adoption of limitations
on agricultural spending increases. On the other hand, the European Council
has in no way seriously changed either the pro–agricultural path of the CAP
or represented a serious counterweight to the agricultural interests in the EU
decision–making process.
The Commission is also a kind of horizontal policy entrepreneur that can
play its role because of its relative freedom vis–à–vis its principals. This insti-
tution has been pressing for CAP reforms for years without much success.
The Commission is the only institution maintaining the general interest of the
EU; however, this institution has limited power, as it can only make propos-
als that it can observe being watered down in the Council of Ministers. If and
when the Commission and the responsible commissioner are willing and able
to play the role of recognising the super asymmetrical political system of the
CAP, they can still get along with the reform proposals. However, there must
be a decisive source of reform: the external pressure during the international
trade negotiations. At the same time, it is imperative that the usual bureau-
cratic politics of the Commission are kept under tight control, e.g., through
limiting the number of bureaucrats in the decisive initial phases of the reform
process.
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Notes
1. See http://agritrade.cta.int//capreform/analysis.htm (accessed 25 November 2005).
2. Thus, this article does not rule out the influence of ideational factors on the design of the CAP
reform, but argues that the rational choice framework is able to explain the most important aspects
of the reform in the simplest manner. Ideational explanations might increase explanatory power by
filling out the ‘blind spots’ of the rational choice perspective. For example, Lynggaard explains that
ecological ideals have been incorporated into the CAP during a period from 1993–2003
(Lynggaard 2003: 292). This adds ‘flesh and blood’ to the explanation generated by rational choice
theory but does not contradict it, as this ideational impact does not alter the costs and benefits for
the central actors.
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3. As stated by one of the participants in the negotiations on the 2003 reform, “We did not ignore the
question of welfare losses, however, the improvements by having a reform were so many, and the
difficulties in reaching an agreement on the reform were so huge, that it was impossible to do it any
better”.
4. The European Parliament did, however, appear to have had some influence on minor reforms of
certain areas in the 1980s, e.g., the reform of the wine sector (1985), the new structural policy
(1987), the stabilisator package (1988), and the initiative on budgetary discipline (1988).
5. The European Parliament does have some additional influence on CAP spending, as it has
competencies with regard to the Community Budget. In the 1980s, the Parliament rejected the
Community Budget on account of excessive agricultural spending; however, that option has not
been used since.
6. Under the decision–making rules in the Council of Ministers that applied until 1 November 2004, a
qualified majority required 62 of the 87 total votes in the Council of Ministers. Subsequent to the
Enlargement, a new set of decision–making rules and a new distribution of votes entered into force.
Hence, a qualified majority can be attained if two conditions are fulfilled: firstly, a simple majority
of the member states must back the proposal in question (in some areas, a two–thirds majority is
required). Secondly, a qualified majority requires 72.3 per cent of the weighed votes in the Council,
which concretely meant 232 votes, as the total number of votes in the Council of Ministers was also
raised from 87 to 321. Moreover, the member states constituting the qualified majority must
represent at least 62 per cent of European citizens.
7. At least when not taking the internal decision–making costs into consideration (i.e., the time and
resources necessary to reach a common position) (see, e.g., Buchanan & Tullock 1964, ch. 6 or
Mueller 2003, 67–74).
8. As mentioned previously, however, at the bureaucratic level in the Commission, preferences must be
expected to be more in favour of continuing and building up agricultural protectionism.
9. Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24–25 March 1999: “the Commission and the
Council are requested to pursue additional savings to ensure that the total expenditure, excluding
rural development and veterinary measures, in the 2000–2006 period will not overshoot an average
annual expenditure of 40.5 billion euros. Therefore, the European Council invites the Commission
to submit a report in 2002 to the Council on the development of agricultural expenditure accompa-
nied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, and requests the Council to take the necessary decisions
in line with the objectives of the reform.”
10. See COPA (2002), Our Vision for the Future: A Sustainable Agriculture for all Europeans, Brussels.
11. See Oxfam (2002), Europe’s Double Standards, London.
12. NGOs defending consumers, developing countries and the environment.
13. Information from Anders Buch Kristensen, former Head of Department, the Danish Permanent
Representation in Brussels.
14. Information from Anders Buch Kristensen, former Head of Department, the Danish Permanent
Representation in Brussels.
15. Another interpretation of the Franco–German deal was that Schröder sought to gain French
support for the forthcoming debate on the EU takeover directive (cf. http://www.euractiv.com//
Article?tcmuri=tcm:29–109985–16&type=Analysis, accessed 12 January 2006). However, this
does not correspond to the fact that Germany had already received support from the UK in order to
uphold a blocking minority in the Council of Ministers against the takeover directive (cf.
Nedergaard 2006).
16. The main conclusion from the Agricultural Council of Minister’s Meeting of 5 December 2002, was
that, “In general, most of the delegations considered that a fundamental reform should not take place
before 2006 and should be preceded by examination of the policy options, based on detailed
studies…” (Secretariat of the Council of Ministers doc. 15298, 2002).
17. Criteria for defining support as ‘Green Box’ in the WTO negotiations is that the support does not
distort trade. ‘Blue Box’ support includes trade–distorting subsidies, but they are to be capped at no
more than 5 per cent of the value of a country’s agricultural production.
18. Royal Bank of Scotland Agricultural Survey from November 2005, cf. http://www.cheap–loans–
finder.co.uk/news/11–12–2005–CAP–reform.html accessed 12 January 2006).
19. Telephone interview with Peter Anthonisen, Chief Adviser in the Danish Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Fisheries (13 January 2006).
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